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Defining Civil RICO’s “Injury to Business or Property” Requirement – Part 5

By Randy D. Gordon
November 12, 2026
Texas Lawyer

Defining Civil RICO’s “Injury to Business or Property” Requirement – Part 5

By Randy D. Gordon
November 12, 2026
Texas Lawyer

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In this final installment, I argue that the majority, minority, and the parties missed the point at which Horn first suffered an injury (a purchase provoked by a misrepresentation) and that, therefore, his claim of injury was really a claim for relief in the form of consequential damages.


In prior installments in this series, we walked through the analytical choices made in Medical Marijuana v. Horn by the majority and dissent as they attempted to define civil RICO’s injury to business or property requirement. In this final installment, I argue that the majority, minority, and the parties missed the point at which Horn first suffered an injury (a purchase provoked by a misrepresentation) and that, therefore, his claim of injury was really a claim for relief in the form of consequential damages.

Consequential damages are defined as “[l]osses that do not flow directly and immediately from an injurious act but that result indirectly from the act.” Under one line of reasoning, to tie back to our injury-as-right-invasion discussion, “every infringement of a right triggers an award of damages for the value of that right and compensatory damages are merely additional consequential damages in so far as losses have been suffered.” So, to revert to Justice Kavanaugh’s example, a judgment in the case of a negligently run-down plaintiff is composed of two parts: (1) damages for the value of the infringed right to bodily integrity and (2) consequential damages for pecuniary (medical bills, lost wages, etc.) and non-pecuniary (pain and suffering, consortium, etc.) losses. This scheme works for intentional torts as well—e.g., false imprisonment damages would include direct damages for the invaded right to freedom, plus consequential damages for any pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses.

In Medical Marijuana, the acts complained of, which civil RICO jurisprudence helpfully labels as predicate acts, are—as we’ve already discussed—mail and wire fraud founded on misrepresentations that Dixie X is THC free. Both the main dissent and Medical Marijuana argue about the impact of losses that are downstream from, flow from, or are consequences of fraud, but nobody considered them in light of the well-developed and much discussed tort and contract concept of “consequential damages,” a concept that traces to Hadley v. Baxendale. In that case, millers contracted with a somewhat distant manufacturer to fabricate a crankshaft to replace one that had broken. To ensure a proper fit, the millers needed to transport the broken crankshaft to the factory as a pattern before they could begin the new fabrication. In response, the millers contracted with the defendants to deliver the crankshaft to the factory. But the shipper negligently delivered the shaft late, which resulted in a delay in the manufacture of the new shaft and a concomitant delay in resumption of milling operations. As a consequence, the millers suffered losses in the form of lost profits and wages paid to their idle workforce.

The millers sued the carriers for their losses, who defended on the theory that the millers’ losses were too remote. The millers won at trial and the carriers appealed. The Court of Exchequer ordered a new trial and “deem[ed] to be expedient and necessary to state explicitly the rule which the Judge, at the next trial, ought, in our opinion, to direct the jury to be governed by when they estimate the damages.” Without using the phrase “consequential damages,” the court set out the general rule for determining cognizable damages, a rule that continues to be followed to this day:

Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.

Initially, this was of course a contract rule, but it soon enough became a tort rule, too. Evra v. Swiss Bank is representative of the spillover from one domain to another. There, to simplify a bit, a bank allowed a $27,000 wire order to go astray with enormous consequences for the sender. In a bench trial, the judge determined that the bank was negligent and liable to the plaintiff for $2.1 million. On appeal, Judge Posner framed the judgment as one for “costs and lost profits—‘consequential’ or, as they are sometimes called, ‘special’ damages.” Given that framing, “[t]he only issue is whether it was entitled to consequential damages.” As a court sitting in diversity, the first task was to decide how Illinois would view consequential damages. Ample precedent was in place: “The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale—that consequential damages will not be awarded unless the defendant was put on notice of the special circumstances giving rise to them—has been applied in many Illinois cases, and Hadley was cited approvingly.” One case in particular, Siegel v. Western Union Tel., seemed particularly apt:

In Siegel, the plaintiff had delivered $200 to Western Union with instructions to transmit it to a friend of the plaintiff's. The money was to be bet (legally) on a horse, but this was not disclosed in the instructions. Western Union misdirected the money order and it did not reach the friend until several hours after the race had taken place. The horse that the plaintiff had intended to bet on won and would have paid $1,650 on the plaintiff's $200 bet if the bet had been placed. He sued Western Union for his $1,450 lost profit, but the court held that under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, Western Union was not liable, because it "had no notice or knowledge of the purpose for which the money was being transmitted."

The remaining issue was whether it made any difference that—in the precedential authority (Hadley and Siegel)—the negligence took place within the context of a contractual relationship. The court found that it did, for two reasons: first, because the plaintiff was culpable in that it could have avoided the consequences with minimal effort, and second, because—and this is a more salient point with respect to Medical Marijuana—“[t]he rule of Hadley v. Baxendale links up with tort concepts in another way …, [namely, that] [t]he rule is sometimes stated in the form that only foreseeable damages are recoverable in a breach of contract action.” Cast in this light, “it corresponds to the tort principle that limits liability to the foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s carelessness.” Armed with those insights, the court determined that—although the defendant might have a metaphysical awareness that failure to perfect a $27,000 wire transfer could cause substantial damage—“that kind of general foreseeability, which is present in virtually every case, does not justify an award of consequential damages.”

This line of reasoning should have doomed Horn’s case. For if—as Justice Barrett suggests (and other Justices noted in oral argument)—Horn’s RICO claim should fail for reasons of remoteness of causation, then—even if he suffered a loss in his business or property—it too must fail for the same reason.

Because this case presented a question that was nearly of first impression, both` the Justices and the parties argued via hypotheticals rather than precedent. And with no agreed-upon organizing principle at hand, the hypotheticals tell in scattered directions and wind up illuminating very little. But once we apply the logic of consequential damages to the hypotheticals, the troubles with them mostly evaporate. Let’s look at Medical Marijuana’s hypotheticals, which—as Justice Barrett correctly notes—aren’t susceptible to a “guiding principle.” In the first, “if a mobster assaults a carwash owner and the owner does ‘business with the mob’ as a result, the owner has suffered a ‘business or property injury.’” But has it? No. The owner has suffered a personal injury (invasion of bodily integrity), and then later, loses profits in his business when he can no longer use “a cheaper, legitimate competitor.” So instead of having “a prototypical business or property injury,” the owner has suffered consequential damages to his business. And what “if Tony Soprano drains a bank account using a computer password obtained by violence? Mr. Soprano has injured the account holder’s property by taking his money.” This is at once a better and worse example because there are two separate acts: the violent assault that dislodged the account number from the owner (personal injury) and the digital bank fraud when Tony uses the purloined number to drain the account (property injury). So no, the act of assault is not compensable. The act of stealing the stolen money is, but not for the reasons that the parties disputed—it’s because two separate acts (assault and bank fraud) invaded two separate rights (bodily integrity and freedom from deceit).

Now, for comparison, can we come up with a cleaner example of a single predicate act causing personal and business/property injury? Suppose our hypothetical mobster running a protection racket has a recalcitrant storeowner in his territory. As a lesson to the other shopkeepers in the area, he firebombs the store of the holdout while the owner is inside. Here, assuming that act of arson causes the building to burn down and the owner to suffer smoke inhalation, then we have both business/property injury and personal injury from the same act. The former will be recoverable, and the latter will not—the reason being that the single act invaded two separate rights, simultaneously causing two separate injuries, one within Section 1964(c), one without.

What’s next? As Justice Thomas plainly saw, the number of open questions will no doubt sow confusion in the lower courts and soon enough provide occasion for a more thorough review on a tidier record. In the meantime, although I agree with Justice Barrett’s prediction that causation problems will weed out claims like Horn’s and thereby limit ultimate RICO liability, I think the majority overlooks the litigation risk that the majority opinion will inject into the system. The invitation to seek treble damages and attorney fees is an attractive lure for plaintiffs looking for an opportunity to pursue fraud-based product liability claims as class actions or multidistrict litigations. And as everyone knows from the pre-Anza, pre-Hemi days, the threat of multi-billion dollar liability is sufficient to drive massive settlements.


Randy D. Gordon is the founding partner of the Dallas and Fort Worth offices of Duane Morris. He is executive professor of law, history, and performance, visualization & fine arts at Texas A&M University. This series is excerpted from a forthcoming article, “Defining Civil RICO’s ‘Injury to Business or Property’ Requirement: The Supreme Court Takes a Few Steps, Says It Punts, but Actually Fumbles,” in the Penn State Law Review.

Reprinted with permission from © ALM Media Properties LLC. All rights reserved.